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ABSTRACT
As overall union membership stagnates nationwide due to the contraction
of traditionally unionized industries, labor organizations have made historic
inroads into new, highly volatile employment sectors, including digital media, tech, political campaigns, and the gig economy. One such sector that
has seen new life is state and local legislative employees. Excluded from coverage by the National Labor Relations Act, legislative employees have been
subject to disparate labor rights, job protections, and terms and conditions
of employment across and within states. While efforts to secure collective
bargaining rights for this sector have occurred over the past twenty-five
years, the simultaneous yet uncoordinated unionization efforts since August
2019 of staff in six seven states and Congress have brought new national
attention to the issue. As member-organizers seek to build a nationwide
movement of legislative employee bargaining, this essay considers the lessons of existing and past legislative, judicial, and organizing efforts. Each
organizing attempt offers a unique response to a distinct set of laws, actors,
and geography; while some of those choices may be replicable elsewhere,
more likely any future campaigns will need to be bespoke. As we enter the
third year of a pandemic that continues to destabilize traditional workplaces,
additional efforts, drawing inspiration and lessons from existing units, will
continue to appear and contribute in yet another unique manner to this stillemergent area of public sector organizing.
INTRODUCTION
As overall union membership stagnates nationwide due to the contraction
of traditionally unionized industries, labor organizations have made historic
inroads into new, highly volatile employment sectors, including digital media, tech, political campaigns, and the gig economy.1 One such sector that
has seen new life is state and local legislative employees. Excluded from coverage by the National Labor Relations Act, legislative employees have been
subject to disparate labor rights, job protections, and terms and conditions of
employment across and within states. While efforts to secure collective bargaining rights for this sector have occurred over the past twenty-five years,
the simultaneous yet uncoordinated unionization efforts since August 2019
of staff in seven states and Congress have brought new national attention to
the issue.

1
Steven Greenhouse, The Faces of a New Union Movement, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/photo-booth/the-faces-of-a-new-union-movement; Dan Kopf, Union
Membership in the US Keeps on Falling, Like Almost Everywhere Else, QUARTZ (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://qz.com/1542019/union-membership-in-the-us-keeps-on-falling-like-almost-everywhere-else.
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As member-organizers seek to build a nationwide movement of legislative
employee bargaining, this essay considers the lessons of existing and past
legislative, judicial, and organizing efforts. Each organizing attempt offers a
unique response to a distinct set of laws, actors, and geography; while some
of those choices may be replicable elsewhere, more likely any future campaigns will need to be bespoke.
In many jurisdictions, the at-will status,2 civil service status,3 total number,4 or salaries and benefits5 of legislative employees are either directly codified or the processes for determination are outlined by local or state law. 6 A
law adopted by the legislative body corresponding to a putative union may
be subject to change as part of negotiations and may, arguably, raise issues
of conflict.7 Within a state that has approved such legislation, a prospective
municipal organizing effort must contend with significant constraints on the
areas of bargaining.

2

See, e.g., NAPOLEON, OH., CHARTER § 2.10 (2000) (“Council shall appoint… employees to directly serve the Council, all of whom shall serve at the pleasure of Council and all of whom shall be
suspended or removed by Council at any time, with or without cause”); but see STAMFORD, CT., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 40-152 (2021) (“The services of the position of Legislative Aide are to be obtained on a
contractual basis for a period not to exceed five (5) years. Such contract shall be approved with the advice
and consent of the Board of Representatives…. Such contract will be in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the work specifications attached to this ordinance, and any terms and conditions relative to
conditions of employment, which may be negotiated when reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes
of this ordinance.”); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 21.155(4) (1973) (requiring the passage of a resolution to
allow employees to continue in employment after adjournment).
3
See, e.g., CINCINNATI, OH. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 101-37 (2021); STAMFORD, CT. CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 40-151 (2021); ANNE ARUNDEL CNTY, MD., CODE § 802(13) (2005).
4
See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:69A-60.5 (2020) (setting number of permitted staff based on municipal population); CINCINNATI, OHIO CODE OF ORDINANCE § 101-37 (2021) (Each member of council
shall have the power of appointment for three full-time and three part-time unclassified positions in the
legislative service of the council); BUFFALO, N.Y., CHARTER § 3-7 (2021) (“appoint … staff to the common council as deemed necessary for the proper functioning of the common council, provided that, until
January 1, 2006, such other staff to the common council shall be limited in number to 37.”); MO. REV.
STAT. § 21.155(2)-(3) (2021) (each member may employ one stenographer or secretary).
5
See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:69A-60.5 (2020) (as of 2019, the salaries of council aides are
adopted by ordinance, they were previously capped at $15,000); CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCE
§ 101-39 (2021); JERSEY CITY, N.J. CODE OF ORDINANCE § 53-7 (exempting aides from workday regulations).
6
See, e.g., CHARTER OF ALBANY CNTY ch. C, art. 2, § 204.
7
Sean Greene, New Castle County Council Overrides Veto, Approves Council Employee Pay Raise,
WDEL.COM (Mar. 11, 2020) https://www.wdel.com/news/new-castle-county-council-overrides-veto-approves-council-employee-pay/article_a4b818ec-6358-11ea-a252-cf7b1ec354c1.html.
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While the legislative branch sets its own budget in some political subdivisions, it is capped elsewhere by ordinance or subject to negotiation.8 Greater
budget flexibility corresponds to an increased ability to raise salaries or fringe
costs as part of collective bargaining. In some states and localities, the legislative body is tasked with approving memorandums of understanding and
collective bargaining agreements.9 Such responsibility can potentially raise
the imprimatur of conflicts of interest, either for contracts covering legislative employees or other members of an employee organization with which
they have affiliated.10 Even within these universally at-will relationships,
most staff operate under a presumption of job security with an acknowledgment that their tenure will conclude at the end of the elected official’s term,
which can be upset by sudden departures of the member.11 While many of
these considerations weigh on the wisdom or futility of organizing within a
given statehouse or municipal legislature, the legality and protections afforded to staff seeking to engage in such activities vary widely.
Section I begins by charting the history of federal labor law, the comparatively recent expansion of collective bargaining to federal employees, and its
exclusion of the sub-federal public sector workforce. This section continues
with a review of the history of the Congressional Accountability Act, which
first applied federal labor and employment law to the legislative branch, and
new organizing by congressional staff to finally fully extend its protections.
Section I concludes with a survey of the status of state-level public sector
8
See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y. CHARTER § 243 (2004); ANNE ARUNDEL CNTY., MD., CODE art. VII, §
704 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 11-135 (Westlaw through 2021 first Reg. Sess. & Spec. “A” Sess. 27
Leg.); ALLEGHENY CNTY. PA. CHARTER § 5-305.01(C) (“The appropriation in each annual operating
budget for [the] County Council[]… shall not exceed 0.4% of the County's annual locally levied tax revenues…”); CHARTER OF ALBANY CNTY., N.Y. § 204 (“within the appropriations approved by the county
executive for such staff”).
9
See, e.g., FAIRBANKS, ALASKA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 42-1; CONN. GEN. STANT. ANN. § 5-278
(Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess. & 2021 June Spec. Sess.) (The General Assembly may approve any
such agreement as a whole by a majority vote of each house or may reject such agreement as a whole by
a majority vote of either house.); N.H. REV. ST. ANN. § 273-A:3 (through 2021 Reg. Sess.) (Only cost
items shall be submitted to the legislative body of the public employer for approval at the next annual
meeting of the legislative body); PROVIDENCE, R.I. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17–27 (1982) (“No collective
bargaining agreement between the City of Providence and any labor organization shall become effective
unless and until ratified by the Providence city council.”).
10
CHARTER OF BUFFALO, N.Y. § 3-7 (2000). A potentially similar issue is presented by jurisdictions
like Buffalo, NY where the Common Council is empowered “to fix the salary and compensation of every
officer and employee of the city except as may be otherwise provided by law.”
11
Ass’n of Legis. Emp. (@NYCCouncilUnion), TWITTER (Jan. 26, 2020, 12:38 PM), https://twitter.com/NYCCouncilUnion/status/1221487531042246656 (“As CM Espinal moves on, 7 staffers are now
left in precarious employment. When a CM decides to resign before the end of term, staff are unexpectedly
left without jobs. NYC Council needs a clearer process and avenues for employee protection and transition.”). Some jurisdictions anticipate this scenario better than others. CINCINNATI, OHIO CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 101-37 (2013) (“Should a member of council vacate office before the expiration of a
council term, the council may extend the appointment of the council member's appointees for a term not
to extend beyond the assumption of office by the council member's successor in office.”).
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labor law, identifying which jurisdictions do and do not extend the right to
organize to governmental employees generally, and in some cases specifically to legislative staff. Section II discusses those statehouses and municipal
legislatures where staff have unionized or sought to, as well as legislative
efforts in additional states to extend existing public sector labor regimes to
the chambers. The article concludes with an analysis of pervasive hurdles and
considerations for staff seeking to initiate a collective bargaining campaign.
I. STATUS OF FEDERAL AND STATE PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING LAW
Unionization of public sector employees has historically been disfavored,
and to the extent that it has been permitted, it is generally accompanied by
greater constraints than confronted by private sector employees. While the
first union of governmental employees, the National Association of Letter
Carriers, was formed in 1889, “gag rules” imposed by President Theodore
Roosevelt and William Howard Taft via Executive Orders precluded employee organizations from lobbying Congress.12 The 1912 Lloyd-LaFollette
Act guaranteed federal employees the right “to furnish information to either
House of Congress, or to a committee or Member thereof” and allowed them
to join labor organizations, as long as such organizations forbade strikes
against the government.13 The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which
guaranteed private sector employees the right to self-organize, form labor organizations, collectively bargain, and engage in concerted activities including strikes, excluded government employees.14 President Franklin D. Roosevelt encapsulated the fears that justified this exclusion, arguing that “the
process of collective bargaining...cannot be transplanted into the public service...The very nature and purposes of government make it impossible for
administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual
discussions with government employee organizations.”15
The Labor Management Relations (“Taft-Hartley”) Act of 1947, which
severely restricted the activities and powers of labor unions, prohibited federal employees from striking or joining union leadership.16 Executive Order
10988, issued by President Kennedy in 1962, granted federal employees the
12
CIVIL SERVICE COMM’N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PUBLIC MANAGER (STATE AND LOCAL):
PREFERENCE MATERIALS 2 (1975), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED117381.pdf.
13
5 U.S.C. § 7211 (1978).
14
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
15
Letter on the Resolution of Federation of Federal Employees Against Strikes in Federal Service
(Aug. 16, 1937), available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-the-resolution-federation-federal-employees-against-strikes-federal-service.
16
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. 80–101, ch. 7, subch. II, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b).
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right to engage in collective bargaining through labor organizations, and was
subsequently expanded in 1969 by President Nixon and further in 1975 by
President Ford.17 Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, finally codified collective bargaining rights for executive branch federal employees in statute.18
However, compared to the permitted scope of bargaining under private-sector labor law, the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute
(“FSLMRS”) substantially restricts the subjects on which public-sector unions may negotiate. Wages and fringe benefits, which are fixed pursuant to
various federal statutory provisions, are off-limits to bargaining, and federal
agencies are expressly given a wide range of substantive management
rights.19
A. Congressional Accountability Act
The Congressional Accountability Act (“CAA”) in 1995 altered the exclusion of legislative branch employees from the protections of eleven federal
workplace laws, including the FSLMRS, and established the Office of Compliance (“OOC”) to administer the newly-applicable laws.20 The OOC was
directed to adhere to existing Secretary of Labor regulations for each of the
eleven workplace statutes, unless it determined that modifying such regulations would be more effective for implementation of the covered right.21 Failure to issue a rule, or secure Congressional approval, would trigger statutory
coverage based on “the most relevant substantive executive agency regulation” except as it pertained to employees' rights to join a union and engage in
collective bargaining under the FSLMRS.22 Though included in the CAA,
this carve-out reflected the largely partisan split in the positions of leadership.
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott stated that "[p]ersonally I don't think there
should be unions in those offices" while House Minority Whip Representative David E. Bonior argued that "[a]ll Americans should have the right to
organize, to work together for fair and decent wages, safe working conditions
and a more just society. That's a basic American right."23
Section 220(e) of the CAA directed that anyone employed on a legislator's
17
Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (Jan. 19, 1962); Exec. Order No. 11491, 34 Fed. Reg.
210 (Oct. 31, 1969); Exec. Order No. 11838, 40 Fed. Reg. 27 (Feb. 7, 1975).
18
Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 701, 92 Stat. 111 (1978).
19
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 701, 92 Stat. 1111, 1198 (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 7106).
20
Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §
1301) [hereinafter Congressional Accountability Act].
21
Congressional Accountability Act § 202(d)(2).
22
Congressional Accountability Act § 411.
23
Eric Schmitt, Congress Staff May Not Gain Right to Union, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 1996),
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/23/us/congress-staff-may-not-gain-right-to-union.html.
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personal staff, as well as staff employed by a committee or leadership, was
to be excluded from exercising FSLMRS rights if the OOC determined that
“such exclusion is required because of … a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict; or … Congress's constitutional responsibilities.”24 A congressional failure to approve the OOC rule regarding these issues would result in a denial of such protections to the listed employees.25 The special
provisions governing 220(e) rulemaking were designed to address potential
conflicts that employee unionization would bring to Congressional labor law
functions.
Opponents hypothesized that problematic situations included unionization
by those committee staff overseeing union and management issues such as
“where Printers Union Local 999 comprised of the Senate Labor Committee
managed a Senate investigatory hearing on crime” in the union, or “where
Teamster members of the House Rules Committee expedite the bill that
would create a legislative ban on striker replacement workers.”26 Others argued that congressional unionization did not raise concerns distinct from the
Executive Branch, being that agency legislative affairs office employees,
who are not excluded from the FSLMRS, had comparable legislative responsibilities and “Schedule C” appointees who regularly filled agency policymaking positions, and who too were protected by FSLMRS, were political
rather than career appointees like Congressional staff.27
Before issuing final rules, the OOC received written comments from two
House committee chairs and an additional House member, each of whom argued that broad exclusions from FSLMRS coverage were warranted. Alternatively, the Inspector General of the House, the Secretary of the Senate, and
representatives of three unions each maintained that the OOC should create
no categorical exclusions, but should instead adjudicate employee eligibility
for FSLMRS protection on a case-by-case basis.28 A 28-page submission
from House Oversight Chair Rep. Bill Thomas objecting to initial recommendations from the Board noted that due to the small size of offices and
lack of physical barriers between employee work stations, screening employees for confidential information regarding the member's legislative positions
and strategies or labor-management issues would be virtually impossible and
union membership would “directly impair the alter ego relationship between
24

Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 § 220(e).
Id. at § 220.
26
James T. O'Reilly, Collision in the Congress: Congressional Accountability, Workplace Conflict,
and the Separation of Powers, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 33 (1996).
27
James J. Brudney, Congressional Accountability and Denial: Speech or Debate Clause and Conflict of Interest Challenges to Unionization of Congressional Employees, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 71–72
(1999).
28
Id. at 12–13.
25
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a member and a unionized staffer” by creating a potential conflict of interest
between union loyalty and loyalty to a member and their legislative priorities.29
The OOC adopted final regulations and submitted them to Congress for
approval on August 19, 1996.30 The OOC found that no exclusions were necessary: just as the provisions of the FSLMRS “are sufficient to allow the Executive Branch to carry out its constitutional responsibilities, [they similarly]
are fully sufficient to allow the Legislative Branch to carry out its constitutional responsibilities.”31 Further, the argument that collective bargaining is
“inherently inconsistent” with the conduct of Congress’ constitutional responsibilities was directly at odds with the statutory instruction to adhere to
the existing law to “the greatest extent possible.”32 The Board rejected Members’ interest in “hiring and firing on the basis of ‘political compatibility,’”
the close working relationships between covered staff and their principals,
and the close physical quarters of the offices, as justifications for additional
permissible exclusions.33 The majority report determined that the FSLMRS’s
exclusion of supervisory, managerial and confidential employees categorically resolved any conflicts of interest faced by employees whose jobs involved labor-management policy or practices.34 Moreover, the suggestion
“that exclusion of employees in personal, committee, leadership and party
caucus offices” was necessary to address “the most important legislative conflict of interest issue—the appearance or reality of influencing legislation,”
had no foundation in the law which the Board is bound to apply.35
A concurrence noted that as the FSLMRS narrowly confined the permitted
subjects of bargaining and by barring strikes and slowdowns eliminated most
of labor's leverage, any fears of extending it to Congressional staff were misplaced, “unless one fears the (minimal) requirement that a Congressional employer and its employees communicate about terms and conditions of employment (or, at least those not set by statute) before the employer sets
them.”36 Two of the five Board members dissented from the final rule.37 The
dissent faulted the Board for relying “upon past precedents and concepts
which we believe inapplicable or at least not determinative of the complex
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Schmitt, supra note 23.
142 CONG. REC. 22,000 (1996).
142 CONG. REC. 22,004 (1996).
Id.
Id.
142 CONG. REC. 22,002 (1996).
Id.
142 CONG. REC. 22,008 (1996).
Id.
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issue raised.”38 The dissenters found the comparison of Executive Branch
functions with the legislative process “to be without any legal or constitutional support.”39 They acknowledged that case-by-case adjudication of coverage might be the best means of assuring procedural due process, but still
expressed concerns that given the transient nature of congressional offices
and employees, which in some circumstances might change biennially, caseby-case adjudication might not be resolved “until the employee or the office
itself is no longer part of Congress.”40
Because the regulations did not make the exemptions he had sought in his
testimony, House Oversight Chairman Thomas, perhaps responding to an invitation from the dissent,41 attempted to remand them to the Board, claiming
they “fail[ed] to address issues of fundamental importance to the House of
Representatives.”42 The remand was rejected by Board Chair Glen Nager,
who responded that "the action of the committee raises serious concerns with
respect to the independence of the board."43 The remand led to a stalemate
that has persisted to the present, and which was described by Senator Chuck
Grassley, author of the CAA, in 1998 as “a disgrace to the principles supporting the CAA.”44 In 1996, Congress extended the same eleven workplace statutes to employees of the White House and the Executive Office of the President.45
Notwithstanding Congress’ failure to adopt the OOC regulations, within
two years, there appeared to be little interest among staff to unionize. In a
1997 survey conducted by The Hill, only nine of eighty respondents indicated
an interest in organizing, though fifty-nine indicated that they did not believe
their employing member would be opposed.46 Staffers who had previously
met in hopes of forming a union acknowledged that their efforts had flagged
as the prospects dimmed.47 While Members of Congress are able to voluntarily recognize unions in their office in the absence of the adopted regulations
38

142 CONG. REC. 22,010 (1996).
Id.
40
142 CONG. REC. 22,011 (1996).
41
Id. (“If this dissent has some resonance, perhaps the Congress might consider returning it to the
Board with some guidance as to its intentions regarding the factors to be considered and methodology to
be followed by the Board in reaching its recommendations.”).
42
A.B. Stoddard, Impact of Labor Law on the Hill is Minimal, THE HILL, Mar. 19, 1997 (available
via LexisNexis).
43
Id.
44
Senator Charles Grassley & Jennifer Shaw Schmidt, Practicing What We Preach: A Legislative
History of Congressional Accountability, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 33, 48 (1998).
45
Presidential and Executive Office Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-331, 110 Stat. 4053 (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 3 U.S.C.).
46
Stoddard, supra note 42.
47
Id.
39
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and staff are not prohibited from organizing, they lack protections extended
to other federal workers and lack recourse if a Member refuses to recognize
the putative unit. Instead, in recent years, various of the ten staff associations
have joined together to produce a policy report on racial justice and reform,
increase diversity among Capitol Hill staff, and address the aftermath of the
January 6th attack on the Capitol.48
However, in February 2022, it became evident that these public activities
did not fully encapsulate the extent of staff grievances nor the scope of their
organizing intentions. The results of a five-hundred person survey conducted
by the Congressional Progressive Staff Association released in January revealed that 47% of respondents struggled to pay bills, 85% of respondents
believed Congress was a toxic work environment, and 91% of respondents
wanted to see more protections to give them a voice at work.49 Having initially dodged the question , Speaker Nancy Pelosi clarified her support via
Twitter for a hypothetical staff unionization effort on February 3, 2022.50 The
next day, the Congressional Workers Union (“CWU”) went public and
quickly garnered the social media support of over seventy members of Congress.51 That same week, CWU revealed that they had been organizing for a
year “amid a growing reckoning with poor pay and hostile working conditions” and were seeking “meaningful changes to improve retention, equity,
diversity, and inclusion on Capitol Hill.”52 According to CWU organizers,
notwithstanding certain terms and conditions that were statutorily protected
from bargaining, such as health insurance, they could still bargain over telework policies and health safety protocols, vacation time, paid sick and family
leave, and disciplinary and office procedures as well as pay as long as the

48
Luke Broadwater, Congressional Aides Unite to Push for Change at the Capitol After the Riot,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/11/us/congressional-aides-capitolriot.html.
49
CONG. PROGRESSIVE STAFF ASS’N, BRIEFING: CONGRESSIONAL WORKING CONDITIONS SURVEY
7, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/616b86c93a6fd661d131ee40/t/61f08a1ce6f4ed211c8d51d6/164
3153948206/CPSA+Briefing.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2022).
50
Bryan Metzger and Kayla Epstein, Pelosi Says She Would Support Congressional Staff Unionizing
'If and When Staffers Choose to Exercise That Right,' BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2022), https://www.businessinsider.com/nancy-pelosi-dodges-dear-white-staffers-instagram-capitol-hill-unionization-2022-2.
Pelosi’s Deputy Chief of Staff Drew Hammill tweeted: “Like all Americans, our tireless Congressional
staff have the right to organize their workplace and join together in a union. If and when staffers choose
to exercise that right, they would have Speaker Pelosi’s full support.” Drew Hammill (@Drew_Hammill),
TWITTER (Feb. 3, 2022, 4:17 PM), https://twitter.com/Drew_Hammill/status/1489347324216238083.
51
Emily Wilkins & Ian Kullgren, Hill Staff Trying to Unionize Need Bosses’ Approval First,
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 7, 2022), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/hill-staff-trying-to-unionize-need-their-bosses-approval-first.
52
Congressional Workers Union (@Congress_Union), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2022, 11:00 AM),
https://twitter.com/Congress_Union/status/1489629962705551361.
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total remained within the office’s Member's Representational Allowance,53
which was increased by 21% in March, the largest increase since it was established in 1996 alongside the CAA.54 At the outset, CWU membership
measured in the double-digits of Democratic staff from among the approximately 10,000 total employees.55 Organizers shared, however, that conversations had begun with a few staffers grousing prior to the January 6th attack,
but the events of January 6th were “the straw that broke the camel’s
back…[as] that question of people just not feeling safe has been a huge part
of it” and interest grew into weekly meetings.56
While support from Pelosi and Schumer was effusive, Republican leaders
from both houses were united in opposition, variably characterized it as
“nuts” and “a terrible idea.”57 Even Senator Grassley, who years earlier had
taken to the pages of a law journal to decry the failure to adopt the proposed
rules at initial completion, faced with a potentially imminent unionization
effort, categorized the potential 500 bargaining units as “complicated.”58 In
the House, the Democratic majority can adopt the resolution for their member
offices and committees introduced by Rep. Andy Levin at CWU’s direct request, which boasted 165 cosponsors, by a simple majority. Advancing the
resolution in the Senate to perform the corresponding activation or agree to
the concurrent resolution necessary for Congressional Budget Office or
OCWR staff themselves to unionize, however, would require a sixty vote
majority.59 Such a threshold is likely beyond reach especially in light of skepticism expressed by Sen. Joe Manchin, though Sen. Sherrod Brown has signaled his intention to introduce the resolution regardless.60
53
Emily Wilkins (@emrwilkins), TWITTER (Mar. 3, 2022, 5:13 PM), https://twitter.com/emrwilkins/status/1499508209446539278/photo/2.
54
Abby Vesoulis, Inside the Capitol Hill Staffers’ Effort to Unionize Congress, TIME (Mar. 26,
2022), https://time.com/6160944/capitol-hill-staff-union-congress/.
55
Kayla Epstein, After Pelosi’s Comments, Capitol Hill Staffers Are Trying to Unionize. Here’s the
Complicated Process it Would Take to Make That a Reality, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2022),
https://www.businessinsider.com/capitol-hill-staff-congressional-workers-union-process-pelosi-levin2022-2.
56
Chris Cioffi and Jim Saksa, Hill Staffers Are Organizing. What Could Their Unions Look Like?,
ROLL CALL (Feb. 9, 2022), https://rollcall.com/2022/02/09/hill-staffers-unionizing-what-could-that-looklike/.
57
Jordain Carney & Cristina Marcos, Questions Loom Over How to Form Congressional Staff Union, THE HILL (Feb. 10, 2022), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/593605-questions-loom-over-howto-form-congress-staff-union; John Nichols, Congressional Staffers Are Organizing a Much-Needed Union, THE NATION (Feb. 11, 2022), https://www.thenation.com/article/economy/congress-staff-union/; Caroline Vakil, Congressional Staffers Launch Efforts to Unionize Amid Support From Democratic Leadership, THE HILL (Feb. 4, 2022), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/592897-congressional-stafferslaunch-efforts-to-unionize-amid-support-from-democratic.
58
Grassley & Schmidt, supra note 44; Carney & Marcos, supra note 57.
59
Nichols, supra note 57.
60
Id.
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The Office of Congressional Workplace Rights (“OCWR”), the name
OOC assumed under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform
Act, in a response to a letter from House Administration Committee Chair
Zoe Lofgren unanimously, in a sharp departure from the 3-2 initial OOC vote,
endorsed and urged the adoption of the original 1996 220(e) regulations.61
The regulations, union proponents noted, were identical to the 220(d) provisions that Congress had adopted and under which the various covered offices
like the Architect and Capital Police had been bargaining for a quarter-century.62 The Committee held an oversight hearing on March 2, 2022, to, in the
words of the Chair, “move the House forward on recognizing Congressional
workers’ right to organize.”63 While all the Democratic members in attendance signaled their support, the Republican minority characterized a congressional union as “a solution in search of a problem,” and their invited witness
argued that allowing member staffers to unionize could unconstitutionally
interfere with individual member’s Article I obligations to represent constituents.64 Testimony from the OCWR General Counsel clarified that if the
1996 proposed regulations were adopted, staff in each member office and the
majority and minority staff of each committee would need to organize within
each separately to unionize as they are all governed individually. Thus, while
there is a potential for more than 500 bargaining units, more likely just the
personal staff of Democratic members and the majority staff of committees
would elect to organize if authorized this session. Following the hearing,
CWU issued a statement saying that the “hearing made clear that absolutely
nothing remains in the way of our right to unionize but the question of when
House leadership will bring the resolution to the floor for a vote. Fulfilling

61
Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 115-397, tit. III, § 308, 132
Stat. 5297, 5325–26 (2018); Letter from Rep. Zoe Lofgren to Barbara Childs Wallace (February 8, 2022),
available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HA/HA00/20220302/114451/HHRG-117-HA00-WstateUelmenJ-20220302.pdf; Letter from OCWR Chair to Chairperson Lofgren (February 22, 2022), available
at https://cha.house.gov/sites/democrats.cha.house.gov/files/documents/2022.02.22%20Letter%20from
%20OCWR%20Chair%20to%20Chairperson%20Lofgren%20re%20collective%20bargaining%20regul
ations_0.pdf.
62
Rep. Andy Levin tweeted: “The significance of the House not adopting the OCWR regulations
for 26 years is not that the regulations are stale. They are being used for other Hill employees all the time.
It’s that the House has failed to honor the human rights of its own employees for . . . 26 years.” Rep. Andy
Levin (@RepAndyLevin), TWITTER (Mar. 2, 2022, 3:00 PM), https://twitter.com/RepAndyLevin/status/1499112425299357703.
63
Press Release, Committee on House Administration, Lofgren Announces Upcoming Hearing On
Congressional Workers’ Right To Organize, (Feb. 28. 2022), https://cha.house.gov/media/press-releases/lofgren-announces-upcoming-hearing-congressional-workers-right-organize.
64
Jim Saksa, Parties Clash Over Unionizing Hill Staff at House Hearing, ROLL CALL (Mar. 2, 2022),
https://rollcall.com/2022/03/02/parties-clash-over-unionizing-hill-staff-at-house-hearing/.
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your promise to protect workers’ rights starts with your own. It’s time to get
this done.”65
Administrative hurdles and questions do persist even in the House. For
one, OCWR has identified a linguistic deficiency in the resolution introduced
by Rep. Levin, but the potential reversal of partisan control following the
November midterm elections act as an impending deadline to pass the resolution.66 If adopted prior to the new session and the Republicans do seize
control, outstanding questions remain including whether there is a nondelineated mechanism to revert the authorization to bargain and whether a bargaining unit organized by majority staff of a committee this session will remain such into the next, at least until decertified, if the Democrats transition
into the minority or instead follow them.67 Rep. Levin however, says that
absent his resolution, “our staff lacks the legal right to form a union without
retaliation…[a]nd I really think it’s inappropriate for people to try to slow the
progress of the resolution by getting into the practical realities of how bargaining will unfold if the workers go ahead.”68 In the interim, though, recognizing that the swift action they hoped for is not forthcoming, the CWU is
pursuing voluntary recognition by individual members.69
B. Status of the Law in the States
Currently, the FSLMRS does not extend collective bargaining rights to
state and municipal public employees.70 Since 1959, when Wisconsin became
the first state to create a framework for municipal collective bargaining,71
each state has adopted unique rules governing public-sector unionization,
with merely fifteen states continuing to deny public employees the right to

65
Jacqueline Alemany & Theodoric Meyer, Jan. 6 Committee Alleges Trump, Allies Engaged in
Potential Crimes by Trying to Overturn Election, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/03/jan-6-committee-alleges-trump-allies-engaged-potential-crimes-by-trying-overturn-2020-election/.
66
Vesoulis, supra note 54.
67
Wilkins & Kullgren, supra note 51; Cioffi & Saksa, supra note 56.
68
Chris Cioffi & Jim Saksa, ‘Eyes on the Prize’: Hill Union Backers Should Keep Momentum Going,
Levin Says, ROLL CALL (Feb. 23, 2022), https://rollcall.com/2022/02/23/eyes-on-the-prize-hill-union/.
69
Tobi Raji, et al., The Congressional Workers Union Wants House Democrats to Prioritize Unionization Efforts on the Hill, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/17/congressional-workers-union-wants-house-democrats-prioritize-unionizations-effortshill/.
70
The Public Service Freedom to Negotiate Act would set a minimum nationwide standard of collective bargaining rights that states must provide.
71
1959 Wis. Sess. Laws 509.
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collectively bargain.72 In some states, only certain employees are permitted
to collectively bargain. For instance, in Texas, while state and local officials
are generally prohibited from entering into collective bargaining agreements
regarding hours, wages, or employment conditions,73 other state statutes authorize Lone Star State political subdivisions to bargain with firefighters and
police officers, and the City of Houston is authorized to bargain with all of
its employees.74
Several states explicitly exclude either state or local legislative employees
from statutes authorizing collective bargaining by public employees, including Illinois,75 Florida,76 Wisconsin,77 Ohio,78 Vermont,79 Maryland,80 and
South Dakota.81 While many states explicitly carve out the legislative branch,
such an exclusion is generally not made explicit in statutes authorizing collective bargaining at the municipal level.82 It is uncertain whether this is attributable to the part-time nature of many local governing bodies, which may
lead to particular staff constraints, or to a generally slap-dash approach to
cities by the state. However, the separation of powers is often far less welldefined in local governmental structure.83 This lack of definition potentially
obviates concerns about executive interference in purely internal functions of
the legislative branch. Though unadjudicated, public employee relations statutes in other jurisdictions that fail to explicitly exempt legislative bodies can

72
See JEFFREY H. KEEFE, ECON. POLICY INST., LAWS ENABLING PUBLIC-SECTOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING HAVE NOT LED TO EXCESSIVE PUBLIC-SECTOR PAY 1 (2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/laws-enabling-public-sector-collective-bargaining-have-not-led-to-excessive-public-sector-pay/;
MILLA SANES & JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RESEARCH, REGULATION OF PUBLIC
SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE STATES 4–5 (Mar. 2014), http://cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf; Gary Boyer, AG Herring Celebrates Enactment of Collective Bargaining Legislation,
WFXR, (May 1, 2021), https://www.wfxrtv.com/news/regional-news/virginia-news/ag-herring-celebrates-enactment-of-collective-bargaining-legislation/; Sam Brasch, Colorado Could Be The Next State
NEWS,
(Apr.
16,
2019),
To
Let
Its
Employees
Collectively
Bargain,
CPR
https://www.cpr.org/2019/04/16/colorado-could-be-the-next-state-to-let-its-employees-collectively-bargain/.
73
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 617.002 (West, LexisNexis through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
74
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 146.001 (West, LexisNexis through 2021 Reg. Sess.); TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 174.023 (West, LexisNexis through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
75
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/3 (Lexis through 2021 Sess.).
76
FLA. STAT. § 447.203(3) (2021).
77
WIS. STAT. § 111.81-7 (West 2015).
78
OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01-C (West 2015).
79
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 902-5.
80
MD. CODE ANN., (State Personnel and Pensions) § 3-102 (West 2018).
81
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-18-1 (2020).
82
See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-18-1(7) (2021).
83
Separation of Powers in Municipal Government: Division of Executive and Legislative Authority,
1978 BYU L. REV. 961, 961 (1978).
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be read to extend collective bargaining rights to such employees, including
in Oregon, New York, and New Jersey.84
II. UNIONIZING STATEHOUSES AND CITIES
Over the past decade, legislation has been introduced in at least seven
states to clarify the inclusion of legislative employees within public sector
labor laws. In several other states, such as in Wisconsin from 2001 to 2005,
attempts were made earlier but have since ceased.85 These legislative efforts
illuminate the varied challenges of securing bargaining rights for statehouse
employees.
A. State-level Organizing Campaigns
To date, three statehouses have seen some of the legislative staff unionize,
while a fourth effort fell victim to legal hurdles, and a fifth is presently underway. Maine preceded the others by nearly two decades and remains the
only state to have adopted authorizing legislation, though Washington is days
away at the time of publication and Oregon passed a bill clarifying employerside procedures.86
i. Maine
While bills to extend collective bargaining rights to Maine legislative employees were introduced as early as 1987, the exclusion was not lifted for
non-partisan staff until 1998.87 During the debate over the bill, opponents
noted that “legislative employees already have a grievance procedure, which
is about the only thing that becoming organized would do for them,” and
cautioned against “destroying a relationship that now exists between the staff
… and the Legislature.”88
Supporters countered that the General Assembly should “live under the
laws that it passes on to everybody else,” and since existing processes placed
the burden of redress solely on the shoulders of staff, the legislation provided
for a positive and objective process for communication between leadership

84

See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-3(d) (West 2021).
Wis. Assemb. 180, 2001-02 Leg. (Wis. 2001); Wis. Assemb. 576, 2003-04 Leg. (Wis. 2003); Wis.
Assemb. 369, 2005-06 Leg. (Wis. 2005).
86
S. 113-1312, 1st Sess., at 1 (Me. 1987); H.R. 118-2096, 2d Sess., at 3 (Me. 1997).
87
See S. 113-1312, 1st Sess., at 1 (Me. 1987); H.R. 118-2096, 2d Sess., at 3 (Me. 1997).
88
House Legislative Record of the One Hundred and Eighteenth Legislature of the State of Maine
(House, April 3, 1998 (H2170-2203), 3 ME. STATE LEGISLATURE 2170, 2179 (1998),
https://www.maine.gov/legis/lawlib/lldl/legisrecord118.htm.
85
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and staff.89 One member claimed that the staff with whom he spoke frequently expressed concern over “how political their nonpolitical jobs could
become” if the bill was adopted and placed them in undesirable positions.90
However, a mass staff letter received after the hearing referenced “the need
to establish a clear, consistent mechanism by which legislative employees
can have access to the process by which decisions concerning our livelihood
are made.”91
Though the legislation went into effect immediately, it was not until 2003
that an agreement was reached with the Legislature to organize staff into two
bargaining units.92 Twenty-four Administrative Staff titles joined Maine
State Employees Association Local 1989 after a card check process, and the
“professional” employees— attorneys, analysts, paralegals, and researchers— opted to be represented by the Independent Association of Nonpartisan
Legislative Professionals, an unaffiliated employee organization, through a
secret ballot election.93
ii. Delaware
On January 14, 2020, Delaware State Legislative staffers announced their
intent to affiliate with the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”) Council 81 and create a unit of forty-four staffers of the approximately 170 employees at Legislative Hall, which would
have created the first statehouse union of partisan staff.94 However, the effort
stalled the subsequent month, when the union reversed course on the legality
of the endeavor in a letter.95 While the staff had initially suggested that a 2009
executive order and 2019 law eliminating set bargaining units supported
their legal case, outside counsel wrote that "[i]t simply does not make sense
to pursue an organizing effort because of the restrictions set forth in the

89
Senate Legislative Record (Senate, April 7, 1998 (S2314-2377)), 3 ME. STATE LEGISLATURE
2314, 2349 (1998), https://www.maine.gov/legis/lawlib/lldl/legisrecord118.htm; House Legislative Record of the One Hundred and Eighteenth Legislature of the State of Maine (House, April 3, 1998 (H21702203)), 3 ME. STATE LEGISLATURE 2170, 2184 (1998), https://www.maine.gov/legis/lawlib/lldl/legisrecord118.htm.
90
House Legislative Record of the One Hundred and Eighteenth Legislature of the State of Maine
(House, April 3, 1998 (H2170-2203)), 3 ME. STATE LEGISLATURE 2170, 2185 (1998),
https://www.maine.gov/legis/lawlib/lldl/legisrecord118.htm.
91
Id. at 2180.
92
ME. LABOR RELATIONS BD., ANNUAL REPORT 4–5 (2003), https://digitalmaine.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1081&context=mlrb_docs.
93
Id.; Paul Blest, Historic Union Drive Makes Delaware the First State Again, THE AM. PROSPECT
(Jan. 14, 2020), https://prospect.org/labor/historic-union-drive-makes-delaware-first-state-again/.
94
Id.
95
Sarah Gamard, General Assembly Staffers Can’t Legally Unionize, Says Organization Helping
Them Unionize, DEL. NEWS J., (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/politics/2020/02/24/delaware-general-assembly-staffers-cant-unionize-union-lawyer-says/4858209002/.
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law."96 The letter noted “a question about whether the Public Employment
Relations Board could ever establish a bargaining obligation for the General
Assembly" as the staff was exempt from civil service.97 In the unlikely event
they were able to find a way “past this hurdle,” the letter indicated there was
a "clear separations of powers issue" and "we would be asking the judicial
branch to impose a requirement upon the legislative branch through the executive branch."98 Among those hurdles was a 2010 Delaware Supreme Court
decision that court bailiffs were not covered by the Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”).99 In that ruling, the Court found that since
[t]he Chief Justice has exercised the authority to supervise judicial branch employees’ labor relations by promulgating Judicial Branch Personnel Rules. Those
Rules recognize the right to organize, but do not cede responsibility to the executive branch to decide labor relations issues…we hold that the PERB does not
have jurisdiction over the Union’s petition to represent bailiffs.100

Member-organizers said that despite a labor-friendly legislature, their positions remained at-will and “a union will help us do a better job of retaining
talent, providing basic worker protections and delivering results” for Delaware.101 Pointing to recent state legislation expanding a worker’s right to organize, they characterized the campaign as “a natural place to go with the
work we’re already doing.”102 Despite its brevity, the public effort was beset
with controversy, including a war of words with House Democratic leadership over alleged retaliation against those organizing, including intimidation,
changing work conditions and terminations, and threats of litigation by minority staff “blindsided” by the announcement.103 The minority staff suggested their employers did not mistreat them and that “their reputations have
been tarnished in the eyes of some community members because of a lie” and
as such they were considering taking action to “remedy the damage done to

96

Blest, supra note 93; Letter to Michael Begatto, Exec. Dir. of AFSCME, from Lance Geren (Feb.
19, 2020), https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/politics/2020/02/24/delaware-general-assemblystaffers-cant-unionize-union-lawyer-says/4858209002/.
97
Letter to Michael Begatto, supra note 96.
98
Id.
99
Superior Ct. v. State Pub. Emp. Rel’s Bd., 988 A.2d 429, 431 (Del. 2010).
100
Id.
101
See Blest, supra note 93; Juliana Feliciano Reyes, Delaware General Assembly Staffers Want to
Form County’s First 'Partisan-Inclusive’ Legislative Worker Union, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.inquirer.com/jobs/labor/legislative-staff-union-delaware-general-assembly-afscme20200115.html.
102
Blest, supra note 93.
103
Delaware General Assembly Union (@DelawareGAUnion), TWITTER (Feb.18, 2020, 4:32 PM),
https://twitter.com/delawaregaunion/status/1229881307754303489; Sarah Gamard, Democratic Lawmakers Clash With Group Attempting to Unionize In General Assembly, DEL. ONLINE: THE NEWS J. (Feb.
19, 2020), https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/politics/2020/02/19/democratic-lawmakersclash-group-attempting-unionize-general-assembly/4799777002/.
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some of our staff members’ reputations” and ensure a fair and legal process.”104
iii. Colorado
In March 2021, Colorado statehouse legislative staff announced the culmination of a three-year effort to organize alongside campaign workers as
the Political Workers Guild (“PWG”) of Colorado affiliated with the Communications Workers of America, Local 37074.105 The announcement came
after bureaucratic hurdles and COVID-19 scuttled the successful collection
of a majority of cards during 2020 when the “imbalances and inequities became more obvious."106 At present, PWG Colorado lacks the authority to collective bargain, which would require either an Executive Order or legislation.107 Instead, it is an open union that aides are not obligated to join. In lieu
of formal power, PWG has focused instead on persuasion, including a successful push for legislation making the part-time employees eligible for state
health benefit plans, though aides remain precluded from testifying even on
such pertinent legislation.108
iv. Oregon
On May 28, 2021, Oregon State House staff voted to join IBEW Local 98,
which was selected in part because the union did not actively endorse in local
elections.109 The vote capped off a campaign begun the prior July that had
unfolded entirely virtually due to COVID-19 restrictions at the Capitol.110
Despite years-long interest in unionizing amid questions and “persistent
myths” of legal feasibility, the effort came to the fore following changes to

104
Mari Lou, Senate Republican Caucus Speaks on Unionization Talk, WGMD.COM (Jan. 29, 2020),
https://www.wgmd.com/senate-republican-caucus-speaks-on-unionization-talk/.
105
Mariane Goodland, Legislative Aides at the State Capitol to Unionize, COLO. POLITICS (Mar. 9,
2021), https://www.coloradopolitics.com/news/legislative-aides-at-the-state-capitol-to-unionize/article_39c59fc8-8102-11eb-ae46-8bbe88f1ca95.html.
106
Id.; Sally Davidow, Colorado’s Legislative and Campaign Workers are Forming a Union,
NEWSGUILD (Mar. 9, 2021), https://newsguild.org/colorados-legislative-and-campaign-workers-areforming-a-union/.
107
Davidow, supra note 106.
108
S. 21-244 (Colo. 2021); Heather Bradley, Brooke Holmes, Logan Davis, & Meredith Phillips, Opinion: We’re Colorado Legislative Aides and Political Workers. Here’s Why We Formed a Union, COLO.
SUN (Mar. 28, 2021), https://coloradosun.com/2021/03/28/political-workers-guild-opinion/.
109
Sam Stites & Dirk VanderHart, Oregon Legislative Employees Become First in the Nation to Unionize, OR. PUB. BROAD. (May 28, 2021), https://www.opb.org/article/2021/05/28/oregon-legislaturestaff-members-first-to-unionize/.
110
Statehouse Pioneers: Oregon Legislative Aides First in U.S. to Unionize, IBEW (Aug. 12, 2021),
http://www.ibew.org/media-center/Articles/21Daily/2108/210812_Statehouse.
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Capitol policies around pay and harassment policies.111
While both the Speaker and Majority Leader issued statements supporting
the staff, the Oregon DOJ nevertheless objected to the unit’s petition on the
Legislature’s behalf before the Employment Relations Board (“ERB”), a
move the legislative leaders sought to cast “more as clarifying questions”
than opposition.112 Their submission argued that the Legislature was not a
“public employer” under the State Personnel Relations Law, that this group
of employees would not be an appropriate bargaining unit that met the definition of a “community of interest” required under the law because they
worked for ninety separate and often diametrically opposed offices, and that
staff were categorically excluded as “managerial,” “supervisory,” or “confidential” employees.113 The DOJ also claimed that the Legislature “cannot deliberate regarding management prerogatives behind closed doors and with
limited representatives as other public employers routinely do,” and, as a result, it “will be constitutionally prevented from negotiating with a bargaining
unit in any meaningful way.”114 In April, the Board rejected these arguments
and ordered the May election.115 The ERB found that while the Legislature
could have excluded its own employees from the definition of public employees under the PECBA, as it had expressly from other laws, such a statutory
exclusion was absent.116
In April, due to concerns raised by the DOJ that statutes were unclear on
who would bargain with employees on behalf of the 90 legislators, the Senate
adopted SB 759 to clarify that the Legislative Administrator would fill the
role, mirroring a 1983 law clarifying that the chief justice of the Oregon Supreme Court has authority to bargain with unionized judicial employees, but
it failed to move in the House.117 On August 5th, Rep. Kim Wallan, who
expressed concern about union money in campaigns and the use of staffers’
dues to defeat her re-election, filed a suit challenging the union as “fundamentally incompatible” with the Legislature’s work and separation of powers

111
Jake Thomas, Oregon Legislative Aides Move Forward with First-of-its Kind Union, SALEM
REPORTER (May 4, 2021), https://www.salemreporter.com/posts/4159/oregon-legislative-aides-moveforward-with-first-of-its-kind-union; Dirk VanderHart, Oregon Capitol Aides are One Step Closer to
Forming a Union, OR. PUB. BROADCASTING (Apr. 6, 2021), https://www.opb.org/article/2021/04/06/oregon-capitol-aides-are-step-closer-to-forming-union/.
112
Dirk VanderHart, Oregon Lawmakers Will Introduce a Bill To Help Their Employees Unionize,
OR. PUB. BROADCASTING (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.opb.org/article/2021/02/12/oregon-state-legislature-bill-help-lawmakers-labor-union/.
113
IBEW Local 89, Case No. RC-001-21 30 (2021) (representation).
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
S. 759, 2021 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2021).
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that would “compromise the integrity of the legislative branch and erode trust
by the people toward their elected lawmakers.”118
III. THE WRONG DIRECTION
In fact, two states have repealed statutes that provided collective bargaining coverage for legislative staffers. A prior definition of “public employee”
within the California Government Code provisions relating to state employee
organizations encompassed legislative employees but was amended by the
State Employer-Employee Relations Act of 1978, which established the present collective bargaining for state government employees.119 Likewise, in
Connecticut, the Public Employees Relation Act adopted in 1975 initially
included the legislative branch within the definition of an “employer.”120
However, the statute was amended in 1977 upon the unanimous recommendation of the Legislative Management Committee to exclude legislative
staff.121 The Committee argued that continued inclusion of legislative employees “would appear to make for a very unhealthy situation” and “invit[e]
resentment and misunderstanding on both sides,” whereas the employees
would fare better under an arrangement where Legislative Management
Committee staff offered recommendations to the Committee regarding salaries and work conditions than in a scenario where they were forced to negotiate with the very people for whom they worked.122
A. Mixed Legislative Success
In recent years, legislative proposals, including some that had been rejected over the course of many sessions, have secured committee hearings in
several states. The outcomes of those sessions elucidate the various rationales
that have inspired legislators, many themselves former staffers, to introduce
such bills, as well as a series of recurring concerns that have typified the opposition.
For example, in 2011, the Hawaii House Labor Committee, over the opposition of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, recommended
passage of a measure to eliminate an explicit statutory exclusion of the

118
Katie Streit, Medford Lawmaker Stands Against State Legislative Staff Efforts To Unionize,
FREEDOM FOUND. (Aug. 9, 2021), https://kobi5.com/news/local-news/medford-lawmaker-stands-againststate-legislative-staff-efforts-to- unionize-163716/.
119
CAL. LEGIS., ASSEMBLY DAILY J., Reg. Sess., at 16571-72 (1974).
120
1975 Conn. Acts 780 (Spec. Sess.).
121
1977 Conn. Acts 11 (Reg. Sess.).
122
See DENNIS MELTZER, CONN. OFF. OF LEGIS. RSCH. REP. 87-R-0005 3 (1987).
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legislative branch of both the state and counties from collective bargaining.123
While the Committee determined that allowing legislative employees to unionize would provide them with a larger role in establishing working conditions, their report expressed practical concerns with establishing a single bargaining unit for all types of non-supervisory legislative employees, as
existing bargaining units were statutorily arranged by job classification or
profession, and the bill was amended to retain the rights of the Legislature to
hire and terminate at will.124
Similarly, in 2000 and 2002, California legislators introduced legislation
to respectively directly amend the State Employer-Employee Relations Act
and to specify that employees of the Legislature have the same rights with
respect to working conditions as persons employed in the private sector.125
Both attempts, however, failed to be adopted.126 In 2017, the Legislature
granted collective bargaining rights to Judicial Council employees, leaving
the Legislature itself as the only branch of government whose employees
were precluded from unionizing.127 That year, new legislation to establish a
separate framework for representation and collective bargaining for specified
employees of the Legislature outside the civil service regime was introduced
with one sponsor.128 When it was resubmitted in 2021, forty-four legislators
were signed onto the bill.129 However, the bill analysis issued to accompany
a 2019 hearing on the measure argued that collective bargaining could force
the Legislature to exceed its Constitutional spending cap.130
In other states, legislation has either failed to obtain a hearing or still
awaits one. In Minnesota, legislation was first introduced in 2011 but as
members depart, bills, including a 2019 venture, are repeatedly orphaned,
though new legislation was introduced in January 2022.131 Legislation has
also been introduced in Massachusetts since 2013.132 There, IBEW Local
2222 continues to organize staff seeking an end to long-standing conflicts
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H.R. 2103, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2010); H.R. STAND. COM. REP. NO. 7-10, 25th Leg. (Haw.

2010).
124

H.R. 385, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2011); H.R. STAND. COM. REP. NO. 229, 26th Leg. (Haw.

2011).
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Assemb. B. 2350, 2000 Leg., (Cal. 2000); Assemb. B. 1028, 2001 Leg., (Cal. 2001).
Assemb. B. 2350, 2000 Leg., (Cal. 2000); Assemb. B. 1028, 2002 Leg., (Cal. 2002).
Assemb. B. 83, 2017 Leg., (Cal. 2017).
Assemb. B. 2048, 2018 Leg., (Cal. 2018).
Assemb. B. 314, 2021 Leg., (Cal. 2021).
ASSEMB. COMM. ON PUB. EMP. AND RET., AB 969 at 9 (Cal. 2019).
H.F. 964, 87th Leg. (Minn. 2011); H.F. 2729, 92d Sess. (Minn. 2022); S.F. 1075, 91st Sess. (Minn.

2019).
132
H.R. 3131, 192nd Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2021); H.R. 1613, 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2019); H.R. 3373,
188th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2013).
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around salaries, job descriptions and hiring decisions and a sense of instability from the repeated turnover of the Senate Presidency.133 In July 2020, after
an Ohio House staffer tested positive for COVID-19 and amid furor about
transparency from the Speaker’s Office, House Democrats introduced legislation to eliminate an enumerated statutory provision that banned collective
bargaining for legislative staff.134 Pending Kentucky legislation introduced in
February 2022 to grant collective bargaining right to state employees would
expressly include legislative staff but would require all public employers to
negotiate together as a single union, while Illinois legislation first introduced
in 2020 would address salary and workload disparities between House and
Senate staff.135
In January 2020, the New York Assembly, following sexual harassment
hearings the prior year during which staffers testified about a culture of abuse
and retaliation at the Capital, introduced legislation to extend collective bargaining rights to state legislative employees.136 The legislation garnered the
support of the Sexual Harassment Working Group, which asserted that
“[l]egislative employees deserve all of the labor protections available to the
workforce, including recognizing their right to unionize,” and that the legislation “builds on the lessons learned in last year’s sexual harassment hearings, and the bold unionization work by the NYC Council employees.”137
Others questioned whether the bill had the deleterious effect of misleading
staff into believing that they presently lacked the right to unionize.138

133
Mike Deehan, Mass. State Senate Staff Mulls Move To Unionize, WGBH (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://www.wgbh.org/news/politics/2019/08/15/mass-state-senate-staff-mulls-move-to-unionize; FAQ,
STATE HOUSE EMP. UNION, https://statehouseemployeeunion.org/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2021) (noting that
“[e]very attorney we have discussed this with has a different opinion. If we need enabling legislation, we
will get it.”).
134
H.R. 733, 133rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2020); House Democrats Announce Plans For
A Bill Allowing Legislative Staff To Unionize Following Positive COVID-19 Case In The Ohio House,
OH. HOUSE OF REP. (Jul. 14, 2020), https://www.ohiohouse.gov/news/democrat/house-democrats-announce-plans-for-a-bill-allowing-legislative-staff-to-unionize-following-positive-covid-19-case-in-theohio-house-103461.
135
H.B. 592, 2022 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2022); H.B. 4587, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2020); Kifowit Files
Legislation That Would Allow Legislative Assistants to Unionize, WSPY NEWS (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://www.wspynews.com/news/local/kifowit-files-legislation-that-would-allow-legislative-assistantsto-unionize/article_524e5a24-5289-11ea-9b72-03682f20de8e.html.
136
S. 9623, 2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020); Dennis Slattery, New York State Lawmaker Wants to Give
Legislative Staffers Ability to Unionize, NY DAILY NEWS (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-state-lawmaker-dan-quart-stffers-unionize-collective-bargain-20200130kx6ujy5qbvdxpl2chiptclmwfq-story.html. There is no companion legislation in the State Senate, though
one Senator in summer 2019 indicated ongoing work by his office to that effect. James Skoufis
(@JamesSkoufis), TWITTER (Nov. 10, 2019, 6:25 PM), https://twitter.com/JamesSkoufis/status/1193670969400922119.
137
Slattery, supra note 136.
138
@zaranasirnyc, TWITTER (Jan. 30, 2020, 3:03 PM), https://twitter.com/ZaraNasirNYC/status/1222973535389409282.
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Proponents, however, point to case law that obfuscated whether a legislator,
the legislature, or the state is the ultimate employer for the purposes of civil
rights and sexual harassment law.139
In New Hampshire, the state Supreme Court overturned a Public Employee Labor Relations Board determination that House permanent, full-time
employees were “public employees” protected by the Public Employee Labor
Relations Act.140 The Court concluded that
the legislature did not intend to include itself as a public employer for purposes
of the Act” and that “without an explicit expression of intent, we will not assume
that the legislature intended to surrender to the Governor the authority both to
negotiate the terms and conditions of employment for its employees, and to exclusively represent it in negotiations with its employees.141

The petitioner was eventually elected to the NH Legislature and repeatedly
introduced legislation to override the judgment.142 As recently as 2018, his
bill was decried by a House Committee as a “perennial attempt” unprompted
by staff but rather “a solution looking for a problem ” and which was “flawed
in that it would take away the authority of the presiding officers to deal directly with hiring and firing.”143 However, in 2019, both the Senate and
House moved distinct bills covering nonpartisan employees.144 Republican
leadership opposed the legislation, arguing that “unionizing legislative staff
will make it more difficult for our employees to effectively do their job” especially if the union endorses a candidate challenging an incumbent legislator
or if the union endorsed a losing candidate and staff ended up working for
their opponent.145
An impending signature from Washington Governor Jay Inslee may bring
the first legislative victory for partisan statehouse employees in March 2022
after a tumultuous session. Legislation to extend collective bargaining rights
139
Andrew Gounardes & Yuh-Line Niou, What Albany’s Sex Harassment Victims Deserve: Close
Loophole That Blocks State Employees from Getting Justice in Court, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 7, 2020),
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-what-albanys-sex-harassment-victims-deserve20200207-exck6xhrpfe5tdse76rzwo5bai-story.html. Chapter 139 of 2022 was signed on March 16, 2022,
to close this loophole in the human rights law.
140
Appeal of House Legislative Facilities Subcomm., 685 A.2d 910, 911 (N.H. 1996).
141
Id. at 911–12.
142
See H.B. 363-FN, N.H. Gen. Ct., 2020 Sess. (N.H. 2020); H.B. 1301-FN N.H. Gen. Ct., 2018
Sess. (N.H. 2018); H.B. 1405-FN, N.H. Gen. Ct., 1998 Sess. (N.H. 1998); see also H.B. 1432-FN, N.H.
Gen. Ct., 2016 Sess. (N.H. 2016).
143
Hearing on H.B. 1301-FN Before the H. Comm. on Legis. Admin., 2018 Leg., 165th Sess. 20 (N.H.
2018) (statement of Rep. Sherman Packard, Member, H. Comm, on Legis. Admin.).
144
N.H. SENATE, SENATE JOURNAL 248 (2019); N.H. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE RECORD
56 (2020). As of March 26, 2022, Cushing had reintroduced the bill into the House of Representatives,
but no Senate bill was presently active. H.B. 1041, N.H. Gen. Ct., 2022 Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2022).
145
Press Release, New Hampshire Senate Republican Office, Sen. Morse, French Oppose AntiWorker Legislation Passed in Senate (Feb. 15, 2019).
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to state legislative employees was first introduced in 2011, but languished
until early 2022 when a House bill introduced in January garnered forty sponsors representing 70% of the House Democratic majority.146 However, the
legislation failed to secure a floor vote by February 15, the deadline established for a bill could be passed in its chamber of origin accordingly to the
session calendar, which was understood to doom its passage until 2023, when
House and Senate leadership promised to take it up again.147 In response to
the failed legislative push, over 100 staff, who are organizing with IUPAT
Local 116 but were prohibited from directly lobbying the legislature by ethics
rules, staged a sick-out which drew the support of the Speaker and Majority
Leader.148 However, the sponsor was able to seize upon a loophole permitting
legislation essential to the budget to be introduced after the February 15 deadline to submit a revised proposal which created labor relations office, a timeline for bargaining, and require interim work for legislation next year to grant
legislative staffers bargaining rights that passed the House, 56-41, on March
1 and was adopted by the Senate on the last day of session March 10.149 The
adopted legislation delayed bargaining an additional year beyond the initial
proposal by obligating a newly created Office of State Legislative Labor Relations to study issues related to the implementation of bargaining and give a
final report to the Legislature by Oct. 1, 2023.150 Such timeline would permit
the Legislature to in the 2024 session pass additional legislation outlining the
bargaining process recommended by the new office, though failure to do so
would allow staffers’ bargaining rights to go into effect automatically on May
1, 2024, with the collective bargaining agreement taking effect on July 1,
2025.151
Each bill responds uniquely to state-specific circumstances. In Minnesota,
state employees are legislatively split into 17 bargaining units along

146
H.B. 2041, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Was. 2011); Austin Jenkins, Washington Legislative Staffers Stage
Sick-Out After Unionization Bill Dies, NORTHWEST NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 16, 2022),
https://www.nwnewsnetwork.org/2022-02-16/washington-legislative-staffers-stage-sick-out-after-unionization-bill-dies.
147
Id.
148
Jenkins, supra note 146; Reid Wilson, Washington State Legislative Staff Stage Sick-Out Over
Labor Organizing Bill, THE HILL (Feb. 6, 2022), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/594602-washington-state-legislative-staff-stage-sick-out-over-labor-organizing; International Union of Painters and
Allied Trades (@GoIUPAT), TWITTER (Jan. 11, 2022, 12:14 PM), https://twitter.com/GoIUPAT/status/1480951282101891075.
149
Brett Davis, How Washington’s Legislative Unionization Bill Passed, After Initial Defeat,
LONGVIEW NEWS-J. (Mar. 14, 2022), https://www.news-journal.com/how-washingtons-legislative-unionization-bill-passed-after-initial-defeat/article_f541b287-01bc-5e20-817e-d9fd87d18eaf.html.
150
Janey Valentine, Washington Legislature Considers Collective Bargaining for Legislative Staff,
BALLOTPEDIA NEWS (Feb. 25, 2022), https://news.ballotpedia.org/2022/02/25/washington-legislatureconsiders-collective-bargaining-for-legislative-staff/.
151
H.B. 2124, 2022 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2022).
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occupational lines, so the proposed legislation would create two units: one
for legislative employees of support, administrative, technical, and security
employees (“Legislative Unit”) and a second one for professional employees
(“Legislative Professional Employees Unit”).152 Meanwhile, while in Washington, the proposed legislation would provide collective bargaining rights
without “lumping them into civil service law, which would be like trying to
fit a square peg into a round hole.”153
B. Municipal Efforts
While several states have expressly excluded legislative staff from collective bargaining statutes, such blanket carveouts are less common in municipal
labor relations schemes. Recently, greater unionization success has been witnessed amongst political subdivisions, with legislative staff unionizing in at
least six municipal legislative bodies, half of them in the last two years.154
In August 2019, the three members of the staff of Denver District 10 Council Member Chris Hinds, who himself had joined the union prior to his election, joined the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 17 to secure
“salary protections and an above-standard sexual harassment policy.”155 In
California, legislative staffers in both San Francisco and Oakland are members of citywide unions.156 However, in Oakland, while Council staff have
negotiated some special provisions, such as the provision of food to staff
when the Members are provided with meals at closed session meetings, professional staff are not entitled to various protections of the citywide contract

152

S.F. 1075, 91st Leg. (Minn. 2019).
Jan. 29, 2019 House Labor & Workplace Standards Committee at 47:13,
https://www.tvw.org/watch/?eventID=2019011305.
154
The most recent interaction of the HOPE ASCME Local 123 collective bargaining agreement
covering City of Houston employees now covers Council employees. 2021 MEET AND CONFER
AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE HOUSTON ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE CITY OF
HOUSTON 28 (2021), https://afscmeatwork.org/system/files/2021_hope_meet_and_confer_agreement.pdf; HOPE AFSCME LOCAL 123 CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS 2 (2009),
https://www.hopetx.org/system/files/hope-constitution-and-bylaws-revised.pdf (including City Council
in Downtown District). But see MEET AND CONFER AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE HOUSTON
ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE CITY OF HOUSTON 3 (2011),
http://www.houstontx.gov/hr/files/employee-relations/HOPE%20Final.pdf (agreement excluding the
Council).
155
Andrew Kenney, Denver Councilman’s Staff of 3 Unionizes in Small Victory for Teamsters,
DENVER POST (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/08/06/denver-council-union-teamsters17/; Press Release, Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Denver City Council Office Employees Join Teamsters (Aug. 6, 2019), https://teamster.org/2019/08/denver-city-council-office-employees-join-teamsters/.
156
1835 Legislative Assistant, DEP’T OF HUM. RES. CLASSIFICATION & COMP. DATABASE, http://citidex.sfgov.org/cgi-bin/dhr/findClass.cgi?MyID=1835; AGREEMENT BETWEEN AND FOR THE CITY AND
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO AND IFPTE LOCAL 21, AFL-CIO 2, https://sfdhr.org/sites/default/files/documents/MOUs/Local-21-MOU-2019-2022.pdf; MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CITY OF
OAKLAND AND INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PROFESSIONAL & TECHNICAL ENGINEERS 2–3, 105,
111, https://cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/oak070598.pdf.
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including salary steps, overtime, hours of work and just cause protections.157
The Oakland aides are not permitted in closed session, nor are they privy to
either confidential or closed session materials.158 On September 24, 2019,
SEIU Local 1021 submitted a petition to add the Legislative Aides employed
by the Berkeley City Council to its Community Services Unit.159 On October
25, 2019, the City notified the union that, though it was unclear whether the
aides were managerial or confidential employees excluded from coverage, it
would not oppose the petition for certification.160 Accordingly, on December
2, 2019, the Berkeley Personnel Board officially accepted their accretion with
a modification maintaining their at-will employment status.161
On November 18, 2019, New York City Council (“Council”) staff announced the creation of a new labor union, the Association of Legislative
Employees (“ALE”) and the launch of a card campaign across the 900 Council employees.162 Organizers attributed the formation of ALE to avoiding
conflicts of interest with existing public-sector unions, which considered the
potential unit “politically risky."163 Unionization efforts by Council staff date
to at least 1978, and in the mid-2000s, a nascent effort went as far as producing buttons and a logo.164 However, the current endeavor found its roots in
direct activism in 2016, when Council aides held a silent protest as the Council boosted Members' salaries without commensurate guaranteed raises for
staff.165 The movement then intensified in the wake of the suspension, rather
than expulsion, of Council Member Andy King in October 2019, after his
second substantiated case of staff harassment.166 In January 2020, following
157

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 156 at 2–3, 105, 111.
BERKELEY PERS. BD., DEC. 2, 2019 COMMISSION PACKET 33, https://www.cityofberkeley.info/uploadedFiles/Human_Resources/Commissions/Commission_for_Personnel_Board/December%202019%20Personnel%20Board%20Packet.pdf.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
CITY OF BERKELEY, DECEMBER 2, 2019 PERSONNEL BOARD MINUTES 1–2 (2019),
https://www.cityofberkeley.info/uploadedFiles/Human_Resources/Commissions/Commission_for_Personnel_Board/Minutes%202019-12-02%20(final).pdf.
162
Association of Legislative Employees (ALE) Becomes Largest Legislative Staff Union in the Nation, UNITED WE BARGAIN (Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.nyccouncilunion.com/press.
163
Kathleen Culliton, Council Staffers Launch Union Efforts, PATCH (Nov. 18, 2019),
https://patch.com/new-york/new-york-city/council-staffers-launch-union-efforts.
164
Kathleen Cudahy (@KathleenCudahy), TWITTER (Nov. 18, 2019, 12:15 PM), https://twitter.com/KathleenCudahy/status/1196477002351611906; Mike Schnall (@MikeSchnall), TWITTER (Nov.
16, 2019, 7:47 AM), https://twitter.com/mikeschnall/status/1195684909303697409.
165
Bob Hennelly, DC 37 Looks to Organize City Council Staffers, THE CHIEF LEADER (Nov. 8,
2019), https://thechiefleader.com/news/open_articles/dc-37-looks-to-organize-city-council-staffers-freearticle/article_6c71a6e8-0178-11ea-af02-0f87d15afb41.html.
166
Letter to Speaker Johnson and the New York City Council from Staff, MEDIUM (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://medium.com/@nyccouncilstaff/open-letter-to-speaker-johnson-and-the-new-york-city-councilfrom-staff-a55c522ba4cc; Harassment Free NYCC (@HarassFreeNYCC), TWITTER (Sept. 30, 2020, 1:20
PM), https://twitter.com/HarassFreeNYCC/status/1311355277933936648.
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a shift in strategy, ALE representatives achieved majorities amongst Councilmanic Aides and non-supervisory titles within the Council Finance Division, whose approximately 450 combined staff represented just over half of
total Council employees, and formally requested voluntary recognition.167 In
December 2020, the 23 staff in Finance titles secured voluntary recognition.168 After the union refreshed membership cards which had lapsed due to
coronavirus-related delays, the Council adopted an April 2021 resolution authorizing the Speaker to recognize the Council Member staff with final certification secured in August.169
CONCLUSION
The recently voluntary recognition campaigns, which created units of a
previously unseen scale, provide myriad strategic questions and somewhat
fewer answers for staff seeking to initiate their own efforts and legislative
bodies contending with the legal framework and logistics of such requests.
As additional media attention places a spotlight on these efforts, and with the
potential for the 2020 census to restructure local legislatures across the country, all should prepare for future creative entries into this space, whether with
or ongoing legislative efforts.170
While it might be assumed that certain institutional or statutory conditions
would provide a shared context for the emergence of legislative bargaining,
the small universe of attempts to date suggest that success is largely a function of the shear strength of an assurgent left and a collective response to
societally prevalent harassment, but otherwise devoid of pattern. While the
temporal proximity of the Berkeley, Denver, Delaware, and New York City
efforts was attributable to nothing more than happenstance and a national resurgence of interest in public sector labor activism, the successful campaigns
in Colorado and Oregon drew upon the pitfalls and public discourse of these
predecessors to achieve unique measures of success. This twelve-month doubling of the unionized legislative bodies nationwide offers an opportunity to
reflect upon a set of existentially distinct approaches to a common goal within
an equal number of distinct legal and administrative contexts.
167

Samar Kurshid, City Council Staff Union Expects Recognition and Start to Contract Bargaining
‘Soon’, GOTHAM GAZETTE (July 30, 2020), https://www.gothamgazette.com/city/9633-new-york-citycouncil-staff-union-recognition-collective-bargaining.
168
Sydney Pereira, City Council Staff Union Becomes First Legislative Union in NY State,
GOTHAMIST (Dec. 17, 2020), https://gothamist.com/news/city-council-staff-union-becomes-first-legislative-union-ny-state.
169
Jeff Coltin, New York City Council Aides Are Officially Unionized, After 21-Month Campaign,
CITY & STATE N.Y. (Aug. 22, 2021), https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2021/08/new-york-citycouncil-aides-are-officially-unionized-after-21-month-campaign/184742/.
170
See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 40-69A-60.5 (setting the number of legislative staff permitted by the
municipal population).
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Perhaps most notably, such organizing attempts have largely developed
independently from local legal change. Only in Washington was an organizing campaign directly tied to legislative change; while legislation was enacted in Maine, no certification was filed for six years after the bill’s passage.
Rather, anecdotal evidence would suggest that prior involvement in new
forms of labor organizing or through assurgent political activist fora represent
the sole common thread tying together the fortuitous, shared timing. Indeed,
nearly two decades lapsed between the recognition of the Maine statehouse
unions and the next non-municipal attempt at Legislative Hall in Dover. In a
rebuke to the skeptics who contend that legislative staff joining existing labor
organizations would present conflicts of interest—less than half the organizing efforts forewent joining an extant union. It is perhaps not surprising to
the casual observer that each request for recognition as a bargaining unit was
directed toward a Democratic Party-controlled legislature.171
Logistical hurdles may proliferate depending on the institutional structure,
geography and targeted job titles of the legislative body to be organized. Of
the six cities with organized Councils, the size of the unit ranges from three
in Denver, where the Teamsters represent one of thirteen offices, to approximately 450 in New York City, where ALE represents all fifty-one member
offices and a central Council division. In New York City, while the Finance
titles organized all represented staff in a single building, the Councilmanic
Aide title encompassed more than fifty job sites across the city, and an attempt to organize member staff in a statehouse could require a bargaining
unit to organize across hundreds of miles. Maintaining a shared identity
across such a distance, let alone creating opportunities for meaningful participation in contract negotiation or enforcement or substantive support during
grievance processes, requires intensive introspection and strategizing. While
in Denver, staff elected to organize within a single member office, the legality
of such an approach is tenuous in other jurisdictions and must be weighed
against the administrative burden of numerous micro-unit negotiations. The
high turnover rate inherent to the job, in contrast with many other publicsector workers who may spend their entire careers with a single government
agency, increases the stakes for these scale determinations. Staff are often not
in their positions long enough to get a unified campaign going, fail to perceive a long-term benefit,172 and can require frequent re-enrollment or decertification.
Another potential issue raised by the multi-member nature of the
171

While the Republicans control the Colorado Senate, PWG operates as a minority union.
Rebecca C. Lewis, New York City Staff Unionization Bid Could be Gamechanger, CITY & STATE
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legislatures is who and how determinations are made on their behalf of them
as a single employer under the respective law. While in Maine, the Legislative Council handles collective bargaining negotiations on behalf of the institutions,173 the role of individual members of the body who are the direct, if
not legally ultimate, employers of staffers versus the authority vested in the
internally elected presiding officer remains an open question as potentially
larger units seek to organize.174 While many proposals have sought to integrate legislative staff into existing public-sector employee unionization regimes directly, others like the California legislation have proposed bespoke
rules or regulations.
In localities where the statehouse may dictate many aspects of legislative
staff compensation or employment status, an evaluation of whether unionization is nonetheless valuable can be highly case-specific. Absent the ability
to bargain for wages, a calculus of the comparative value of dues dollars to
achievable grievance or other limited reforms may in some municipalities
obviate against organizing. Efforts to expand to certain municipalities were
ultimately abandoned due to state statutes that established at-will status for
legislative employees and governed permissible wage ceilings.
The COVID-19 pandemic and the uneven implementation of telecommuting policies and other safeguards only heightened staff calls for a collective
voice that could advocate on their behalf. While the public health crisis delayed public movement on the already underway NYC, Colorado, and Delaware negotiations and posed unique hurdles to wet-signature requirements
for unions collecting cards, the switch to digital platforms proved conducive
for additional conversations in and amongst staff at different stages of organizing. As we enter the third year of a pandemic that continues to destabilize
traditional workplaces, additional efforts, drawing inspiration and lessons
from existing units, will continue to appear and contribute in yet another
unique manner to this still-emergent area of public sector organizing.
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See Meeting Summary of January 24, 2008 Meeting of Legislative Council of 123rd Maine State
Legislature, 123 Sess. 11 (Me. 2008), https://legislature.maine.gov/doc/548.
174
N.Y.C. Council Res. 1608-2021 (N.Y. 2021). See also Meeting Summary of January 24, 2008
Meeting of Legislative Council of 123rd Maine State Legislature, 123 Sess. 11 (Me. 2008), https://legislature.maine.gov/doc/548.
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